






Meaning, Happiness, and Misery – 
an Inquiry into Philosophy’s Scope and Limitations
Abstract 
Publications in philosophical practice sometimes refer to the role philosophers had as doc-
tors of the soul and subsequently maintain that practical philosophers should rekindle this 
role. One hundred fifty years after the birth of scientific psychology, this claim should be re-
assessed, and if found wanting, philosophy’s possible role along the psychological doctors 
of the soul should be clarified. Thus, this article enquires into philosophy’s contemporary 
usefulness for individuals by differentiating amongst the four or five main ways in which it 











Many social and political theorists have addressed existential questions late in 
their career. They note that these questions are implied in the political ques-












1   
Former	versions	of	this	paper	were	presented	
at APPA annual meeting and the online Rus-
sian	 conference	 of	 Philosophical	 Practice,	
both	in	July	2020.
2	   
One	 example	 is	 Jeff	 Noonan.	 See	 his	 argu-
ment  on  the  relationship  between  existential  
questions	and	politics:	Jeff	Noonan,	Embodi-

























living	 according	 to	 nature	 to	 help	 us	 overcome	 our	 self-centred	 emotional	
hang-ups	and	to	incite	us	it	to	find	purpose	in	the	cosmos	by	identifying	with	
the cosmic reason (logos)	governing	all	things;	the	Epicurean	therapy	sought	
to	liberate	us	from	unrealistic	anxieties	concerning	death	and	the	gods	and	to	
indicate	how	to	be	content	through	the	basic	satisfaction	of	our	needs,	and	the	
Pyrrhonian	sceptics	urged	us	 to	discard	superfluous	 beliefs	 in	order	 to	find	
peace	of	mind	in	the	realisation	that	uncertainty	is	the	only	certitude.	
As	 learning	 virtue	was	 predicated	 on	 being	 rational,	 the	mentally	 ill	were	
usually	excluded	from	such	 teaching.	Marke	Ahonen	explored	ancient	phi-
losophers’	views	of	mental	illness	and	showed	that	except	for	the	Stoics,	and	





which presupposes rational capacities.




evidence in Hellenistic philosophies that the psychological conditions listed 
above	were	automatically	excluded	from	philosophic	discussions.	Moreover,	
not	only	Aristotle	 analyses	various	 forms	of	mental	 illness	 in	his	writings,	
Plato	is	notoriously	vague	about	the	forms	of	madness,	apart	from	the	discus-
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For	the	pessimist	controversy,	see:	Frederick	
Charles	 Beiser,  Weltschmerz:  Pessimism  in  
German Philosophy, 1860–1900,	Oxford	Uni-
versity	Press,	New	York	2016.
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Marke	 Ahonen,	 “Ancient	 Philosophers	
on	 Mental	 Illness”,	 History  of  Psychia-
try	 30	 (2019)	 1,	 pp.	 3–18,	 doi:	 https://doi.
org/10.1177/0957154X18803508.
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Cf.	 Caelius	 Aurelianus,	 Tardae  passiones 
1.166–167;	 quoted	 in:	M.	Ahonen,	 “Ancient	
Philosophers	on	Mental	Illness”,	p.	14.
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Cf.	Marke	Ahonen,	Mental  Disorders in An-
cient Philosophy,	Springer,	Cham	2014.
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Cf.	 the	first	 chapter	of	Lydia	Amir,	Rethink-
ing  Philosophers  Responsibility,	 Cambridge	
Scholars	 Publishing,	 Newcastle	 upon	 Tyne	
2017.
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Cf.	 Friedrich	 Nietzsche,	 The  Gay  Science,	
translated	 by	 Walter	 Kaufmann,	 Random	
House,	New	York	1974,	“Preface”,	section	1;	














The paper is divided into three parts that correspond to the three main ways 
in	which	philosophy	can	be	useful	for	individuals	today:	the	way	of	meaning	
given	through	the	use	of	philosophic	ideals,	the	criticism	of	meaning	as	lie	
provided	 by	 tragic	 philosophy,	 both	 in	 gloomy	 and	 cheerful	 versions,	 and	
the	criticism	of	ideals	as	ineffective	due	to	the	lack	of	underlying	uniformity,	
again,	under	a	cheerful	or	a	gloomy	guise.	






after	 the	Greek	and	Hellenistic	philosophic	 ideals,	a	non-philosophic	 ideal,	
the  religious  salus	 or	 salvation.	However,	 salvation	 together	with	 all	 phil-












































forms;	 the	Romantic	 ideal	of	 self-realisation,	which	can	be	exemplified	 by	
Nietzsche’s	philosophy,	and	finally,	authenticity,	the	ideal	of	Existential	phi-
losophies,	in	their	religious	or	atheist	guise.	
These	 ideals	work	 by	minimising	 the	 gap	 between	 ideal	 and	 reality,	 once	




Some	 of	 these	 ideals	 minimise	 suffering	 by	 identifying	 its	 cause	 and	 the	
mechanism	that	may	remove	it.	Both	functions,	minimising	suffering	and	be-
stowing	meaning,	 are	 predicated	 on	 a	wider	 perspective,	which	 should	 be	
known  as  true.  This  is  why arguments  are  so important  in  philosophy.  Ide-






predicated  on  philosophy  as  providing  a  wider  context  (which  psychology  
cannot	give	unless	it	uncritically	borrows	from	Eastern	or	Western	philoso-
phies).	They	provide	us	with	sense	also	in	the	connotation	of	direction	and	
bestow dignity on our struggle to improve.
The	 path	 of	 ideals	 is	 one	 way	 of	 making	 good	 use	 of	 philosophy.	
Nietzsche	 characterised	 the	 meaning	 it	 provides	 as	 handling	 the	 fear	 of	
meaningless	 suffering.	 Depending	 on	 the	 ideal	 chosen,	 this	 path	 some-
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Mark	Edmundson,	Self and Soul: A Defense of 
Ideals,	Harvard	University	Press,	Cambridge	
(MA)	2015,	p.	237.
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fering	creates.	As	 far	 as	we	know,	however,	 the	 reality	 is	not	ordered	 in	 a	
cosmos that would be amenable to human understanding and would provide 





to eschew knowledge. 
This criticism recommends a tragic philosophy.12 Tragic philosophies should 
be	carefully	differentiated	from	theories	of	the	absurd,	which	are	still	pred-




















the	 renouncement	of	 all	possessions	 that	 is	 suggested	by	 the	 representation	of	 a	denaturised	
world.”15
Tragic	 philosophies	 negate	meaning,	 yet	 they	 offer	 happiness.16  Becoming  
regains	its	innocence	through	the	notion	of	hazard,	as	what	happens	is	insig-
nificant.	While	the	insertion	into	a	system	of	significations	makes	life	guilty,	
the	 liberating	simplicity	of	 the	 real	 is	accessed	 through	 tragic	 thought,	and	
with this regained innocence comes happiness.  Happiness is  the only thing 
worth	having:	far	from	being	predicated	on	anything	else,	it	is	independent	of	
the	nature	of	reality.	











ridiculous human being that we all are.18
Part III – Ideals are Ineffective






















Montaigne’s	proposal	 is	cheerful	because	he	succeeds	 in	saying	yes	 to	 life	
and	to	himself,	he	triumphs	through	his	humility	where	most	boisterous	phi-
losophers	failed.	His	vision	ends	in	a	theodicy	or	a	cosmodicy	that	could	and	
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ton	2019.
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72.
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Ibid.
16	   
For	happiness,	cf.	L.	Amir,	Rethinking Philos-
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Cf.	 Clément	 Rosset,	 e.g.,	 La  Philosophie  
tragique,	 PUF	 “Quadrige”,	 Paris	 1991;	Clé-
ment	Rosset, Logique du pire,	PUF	“Quadri-
ge”,	 Paris	 1993;	Clément	Rosset,	L’Anti-na-
ture: élements pour une philosophie tragique;	
and,	in	English,	Clément	Rosset, Joyful Cru-
elty: Toward a Philosophy of the Real,	trans-
lated	 by	 David	 F.	 Bell,	 Oxford	 University	
Press,	New	York	1993.
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Cf.	L.	Amir,	Philosophy, Humor, and the Hu-
man Condition.
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Cf.	 Michel	 de	 Montaigne,	 Les  Essais  de  
Michel  de  Montaigne,	 Pierre	 Villey,	 Ver-

















lead him to philosophy but to which philosophy cannot adequately respond. 
This	is	so	because	suffering	excludes	human	company	and	isolates	in	a	way	
that	cannot	be	generalised.	Caring	becomes	rarified	in	the	new	experience	as	
all resources are summoned to help one’s survival. Misery individualises and 
cannot	be	shared	appropriately.	Thus	a	philosophy	of	misery	or	misfortune	






































philosophies  but  also  when  social  programs  aim at  providing  happiness  or  
meaning.	This	is	why	pessimism	was	fashionable	in	19th	century	Germany	








Publikacije u filozofijskoj praksi ponekad se referiraju na ulogu koju su filozofi imali kao liječni-
ci duše i nastavno na to smatraju da bi praktički filozofi morali njegovati tu ulogu. Sto i pedeset 
godina nakon rođenja znanstvene psihologije, ta bi se tvrdnja trebala ponovno razmotriti i nađe 
li se manjkavom, moguća uloga filozofije među psihologijskim doktorima duše trebala bi se 
razjasniti. Stoga ovaj rad razmatra aktualnu korisnost filozofije za pojedince, diferencirajući 
četiri-pet glavnih puteva njene upotrebljivosti danas.
Ključne	riječi
filozofija,	korisnost,	smisao,	sreća,	jad,	ideali,	tragično,	apsurdno,	homo risibilis,	nemoguće
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Penultimate Words and Other Essays (1908),	
Ohio	 University	 Press,	 Athens	 1977.	 “The	
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is	Philonenko’s	book,	La Philosophie du mal-
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philosophie existentielle,	Vrin,	Paris	1998.	In	
French,	 the	 connotation	 is	much	more	 pow-
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misery or catastrophe.
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façon.”
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Richard	 Keshen’s	 achievement.	 Cf.	 Richard	
Keshen,	 Reasonable  Self-Esteem:  A  Life  of  
Meaning,	 McGill-Queen	 University	 Press, 
Montreal	2017.
24	   
For	further	elaboration	on	Nietzsche,	see	Lyd-
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Gruyter,	 Berlin (forthcoming);	 on	 Rosset,	
see	Chapter	3	of	Lydia	Amir,	The Legacy of  
Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Laughter: Bataille, 
Deleuze, Rosset,	Routledge,	New	York	2020;	
and	 on	 Montaigne,	 see	 the	 first	 chapter	 of	






Sinn, Glück und Elend – Ermittlung
der	Spannweite	und	Grenzen	der	Philosophie
Zusammenfassung
Die Publikationen in der philosophischen Praxis rekurrieren zuweilen auf die Rolle, die Philo-
sophen als Ärzte der Seele spielten, und vertreten des Weiteren die Ansicht, dass praktische 
Philosophen diese Rolle fördern sollten. Einhundertfünfzig Jahre nach der Geburt der wissen-
schaftlichen Psychologie sollte diese Behauptung überdacht und, falls sie als mangelhaft be-
funden wird, die etwaige Rolle der Philosophie unter den psychologischen Ärzten der Seele 
geklärt werden. Daher wird in diesem Artikel die aktuelle Nützlichkeit der Philosophie für den 






Le sens, le bonheur et le malheur – étude
du champ philosophique et de ses limites
Résumé
Les publications en philosophie pratique se réfèrent  quelquefois  au rôle  que les  philosophes 
avaient en tant que médecins de l’âme, et ainsi estiment que les philosophes pratiques devraient 
cultiver ce rôle. Cette proposition devrait être reconsidérée cent cinquante ans après la nais-
sance de la psychologie scientifique. Si elle s’avère erronée, le rôle possible de la philosophie 
parmi les doctrines psychologiques devrait être précisé. Ainsi, ce travail analyse l’utilité ac-
tuelle de la philosophie pour les individus en faisant la différence entre quatre, cinq possibilités 
principales concernant son application aujourd’hui.
Mots-clés
philosophie,	utilité,	sens,	bonheur,	malheur,	idéal,	tragique,	absurde,	homo risibilis,	impossible
